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years. The court held that the provision in the Rule that allowed for
the review of the performance of the technologies implemented and
or different design and construction
additional
requiring
technologies, if needed to minimize impingement and entrainment,
was valid, since nothing in the statute forbids the EPA from reevaluating these specific requirements, which are set on a case-by-case
basis, during the re-permitting process. The court also held that the
provision did not conflict with section 306(d), since the statute did not
unambiguously compel the EPA to grandfather in new intake
structures.
MISC finally contended that the below-threshold, state law, and repermitting aspects of the Rule, which required case-by-case
determinations, were inconsistent with the EPA's older regulations
that did not address intake structures. The court held that the EPA's
failure to formalize its approach until the promulgation of the Rule
was irrelevant, since rulemaking is the process by which the EPA
explains the rule as it enforces it.
Therefore, the Second Circuit granted in part and denied in part
the Environmentalists' petition. The court denied UWAG's and
MISC's petitions in full, and remanded to the EPA the provisions of
the Rule that allows compliance through restoration measures.
Stacy Hochman

THIRD CIRCUIT
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 343
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that United States Army Corps of
Engineers' alleged failure to comply with its duty under the Water
Resources Development Act to include environmental protection as
one of its primary missions was subject to judicial review, but its
decision to generally reproduce natural flows in river was not arbitrary
and capricious).
Raymond Proffitt Foundation and Lehigh River Stocking
Association ("Foundation") brought an action against United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting the Corps violated
the Water Resources Development Act of 1990 ("WRDA") by not
including environmental protection as one of the missions for the
Walter Dam. The Foundation further asserted the Corps did not fulfill
its environmental protection mission because it released large amounts
of water during high flow periods, and failed to store water during
high flow periods to release during low flow periods. The district
court found that because WRDA did not provide any law to apply to
the facts of the case, the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore granted
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the Corps' motion for summary judgment. The Foundation appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which upheld the district court's decision, but for different
reasons.
On appeal, the Third Circuit first noted that WRDA requires the
Corps to include environmental protection as one of its primary
purposes in operating and maintaining its water resource projects.
The Foundation argued that the Corps violated this statute because
the Corps emphasized flood control and not fishery management as
the primary purpose of the Walter Dam Reservoir. However, the court
found Congress did not give the Corps specific instructions to carry
out this objective; therefore, the Corps retained a great deal of
discretion to determine where, when, and how much of WRDA's
environmental protection mission to implement at a given water
resources project. After determining that the Corps' actions were
indeed subject to judicial review, the court held that the Corps
satisfactorily demonstrated that it made environmental protection a
primary mission, and its actions were not arbitrary and capricious. The
court then held that the Corps included environmental protection in
its overall operation of its water resource projects, and more
specifically, at the Walter Dam.
In sum, the Third Circuit held the district court erred in finding
that the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial review. However,
Congress gave the Corps a vast amount of discretion to implement
environmental protection as one of the primary Corps' missions in
regards to water resources projects.
Therefore, that the Corps
emphasized flood control and not fishery management as the primary
objective of the Walter Dam Reservoir did not mean that it violated the
WRDA. Thus, the court held the Corps' decision was subject to
judicial review; however, it affirmed the district court's decision due to
the discretion afforded the Corps.
BrettJohnson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
that, for purposes of the Clean Water Act, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, and that a man-made
ditch was a "tributary").
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") brought an
action against Newdunn Associates, Orion Associates, and Northwest
Contractors (collectively "Newdunn") to enjoin them from draining
certain lands in alleged violation of the wetlands provision of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Virginia State Water Control Board

